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ABSTRACT

The judicially created experimental use exemption has traditionally been a
limitation on a patent holder's rights because it allows patent infringing
activities involving research for mere curiosity or amusement. This
exemption was later modified to further protect any research performed by
institutions not having a profit motive for the patent infringement, resulting
in many institutions freely infringing patented inventions, knowing that
broad protection was available under the experimental use exemption.
However, in 2002 the Federal Circuit effectively ended the experimental use
exemption as a defense for academic institutions, by recognizing that
academic institutions can be held liable for infringement for using a patented
technology in the course of its own research. Rather than limiting access to
these inventions in order to protect patent holders' rights, Congress should
impose a compulsory licensing scheme for research tools, which also awards a
reasonable royalty to the patent holder for the use of the patented research
tool. Mandating compulsory licensing allows access to research tools
necessary for progress in science aid technology while protecting the patent
holder's rights in the patented research tool.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to award temporary and
exclusive property rights to anyone who creates a useful invention.1
Congress
enacted the present version of patent law in the Patent Act of 1952,2 which gives a
patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell,
or importing a patented invention in the United States. 3 Anyone who violates a
patent holder's exclusive rights within the United States, and without the permission
of the patent holder, statutorily infringes the patent. 4 A defendant need only commit
a single act in violation of one of the listed activities to be held liable for patent
5
infringement.
The judicially created experimental use exemption (considered both an
exception and defense to patent infringement) is a limitation on a patent holder's
exclusive rights.6 The experimental use exemption arose out of dicta in which Justice
Joseph Story, a leading intellectual property judge in the early years of American
patent litigation, held a defendant not liable for patent infringement. 7 In explaining
his decision, Justice Story stated Congress did not intend for the law to punish
someone who made or used a patented invention out of curiosity, or for mere
amusement.8 In subsequent cases, the experimental use exemption was modified to
include patent infringers who have no profit motive for infringing the patent. 9 This
exemption was further modified to expressly exclude patent infringers whose
infringing activities are within the infringer's line of business. 10 While the Federal
Circuit has repeatedly deemed the experimental use exemption "truly narrow," not
until recently did the court deny this defense in a lawsuit of patent infringement
committed by a university."

*J.D., Lewis and Clark Law School, December 2003, Ph.D. Cell Biology, University of
Nebraska Medical Center, B.S. Biology, University of Minnesota, 1994. Ms. Haindfield's previous
experience includes being an Instructor in Medical Immunology at the University of Nebraska
Medical Center, and receiving a Graduate Fellowship at the University of Nebraska from 1995-1999.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 Ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as Title 35 of the U.S.C. (2000)).
3 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (2002). The 1996 amendment added offering for sale and importing
to the rights of making, using and selling. Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964); Coakwell v. U.S.,
372 F.2d 508, 510 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
1 Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2001).
7 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
8 Id. at 1121.
Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
10Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898).
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003).
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In the wake of the Madey v. Duke University decision, both scientists and legal
experts have voiced opinions about the boundaries of a patent holder's rights and
how those rights may be protected without unnecessarily restricting basic research.
The debate is especially strong regarding patented tools used in biomedical research
12
that directly benefits the public.
This article describes the evolution of the experimental use exemption from its
origin to its present form. Next, the article examines federal legislation that has
allowed academic institutions tremendous capitalization on research, by allowing
researchers to patent inventions that were funded by federal grant money. Such
legislation dramatically increased the number of patents issued to academic
institutions, and it subsequently increased joint commercial ventures between
academic and industrial science. This article addresses the changing relationship of
academic and industrial science and its impact on the need for an experimental use
exemption.
Finally, this article outlines some possible strategies Congress may
employ for maintaining a "truly narrow" experimental use exemption without
eviscerating the property rights of patent holders.

I. EVOLUTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION
The judicially created experimental use exemption (considered both an exception
and defense to patent infringement) is a limitation on a patent holder's right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention
into the United States. 13 The experimental use defense to patent infringement
originated in an 1813 case in which the defendant was found not guilty of infringing
a patent for a card-making machine. 14 Explaining his decision in dicta, Justice
Joseph Story stated that the intent of the patent laws was not to punish a man who
infringes a patent "merely for philosophical experiments" or for purposes of making
15
an invention in order to verify its functionality.
In a subsequent case, Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story applied the experimental use
defense to exempt alleged patent infringers who had no intention of infringing the
patent in order to make a profit. 16 Justice Story rationalized that those who use the
patented invention "for mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the
verity and exactness of the specification" describing the invention, would not be held
liable for patent infringement. 17 Furthermore, only those who infringe patents with
the intent to profit financially actually deprive the patent owner of his "lawful
rewards" preserved by the patent.18
This holding modified the experimental use
exemption and established the motive of profit as the key to whether a particular
alleged infringing activity falls under the experimental use exemption. 19
12

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299
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2003).
' Mueller, supra note 6, at 19.
v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D.Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
'5 Id. at 1121.
'6 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
17Id. at 555.
18Id.
19Mueller, supra note 6, at 20.
14 Whittemore
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Nearly fifty years later, Judge Shipman outlined the present test for
experimental use of a patented invention. 20 Judge Shipman held that courts have
accepted the defense to patent infringement when the alleged infringing activity is
"for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere
amusement.... "21 This test established the present-day, "truly narrow" experimental
use exemption that has only been used successfully for patent infringers whose
activities were motivated not by financial gain, but only by amusement or verification
of the workings of the invention.
The first case involving the experimental use exemption and its role in academic
research came in 1935 with Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co.22 In Ruth, the defendant
illegally sold parts for a patented flotation device to several customers, including the
Colorado School of Mines. 23
These parts allowed the customers to utilize the
improved device without purchasing an entirely new instrument. 24 The district court
held the defendant liable for contributory patent infringement but exempted the
sales to the Colorado School of Mines because the school used its instruments in
conducting research. 25 Thus, the school's research activities fell within the
experimental use exemption because the school derived no financial gain from the
26
use of the patented invention.
Academic institutions believed the Ruth decision provided a broad umbrella of
protection from patent infringement for any educational research. Most academic
institutions freely infringed patented inventions until 2002, when the Federal Circuit
27
weighed in on the experimental use exemption as it relates to academic research.
The court in Madey found Duke University liable for patent infringement when Duke
continued to use Madey's patented laser after Madey himself left the university.
Previously, the district court held that Duke University researchers were using the
patented laser for basic scientific research that was not aimed at commercial
ventures and therefore fell under the experimental use exemption. 28 However, the
Federal Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Duke's own
patent policies verified the use of the laser as furthering its "legitimate business
objectives." 29
The Federal Circuit chastised the district court for its broad
interpretation of the experimental use exemption to apply to any research for
academic, experimental, or non-profit purposes. 30 The Federal Circuit stated that the
focus should not be on whether Duke is a non-profit institution, since such academic
31
institutions frequently conduct research with little or no commercial value.
Instead, the focus should be on Duke's "legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students and faculty," and the university's research

20 Poppenhusen

v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
1049.
2 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936).
2.1Id. at 699.
21 Id. at 710.
25Id. at 703.
2 Id. at 713.
27 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003).
28 Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 28 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
21 Id. at

29 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361.
30 Id.

Id. at 1362.
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which "increase[s] the status of the institution and lure[s] lucrative research grants,
students and faculty.' ' 32 The Federal Circuit characterized Duke as a business and
all research done at the university as being in Duke's line of business, thereby
removing the research (and any patent infringement that occurs in the research)
from the experimental use exemption. 33
The Federal Circuit cited Duke's own policies regarding the patenting of
research conducted at the university as being part of its business objective. 34 The
Federal Circuit said Duke "is not shy" about attaining licenses for its patented work,
and such licensing revenue contributes to Duke's "legitimate business." 35 While not
expressly stating so, the Federal Circuit implied that the university's intent in using
the laser was to profit in the future. Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted that some of
the key evidence in the case was dismissed by the district court, including a
statement from Duke's laser lab Web site that expressed interest in corporate
partnerships and the fact that Duke had already established an hourly fee for any
non-academic laser users (although such fees had not yet been charged to those
users). 36

The Madey decision effectively ended the experimental use exemption as a
defense for patent infringement by academic institutions. 37 In order to understand
the court's rationale, we must examine how academic research has taken on business
characteristics as a result of federal legislation.

II. THE COURTSHIP OF ACADEMIC AND INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent
Procedures Act, which allows private ownership of patented inventions from research
funded by the federal government. 38 Its purpose was to accelerate the development
of inventions that would benefit the public by allowing universities, small businesses
and nonprofit institutions to hold patents on the inventions they generated with
public money. 39
While the federal government retained some rights to the
inventions, 40 it parceled away most of its property rights to the research labs.
32

Id.

:33Id.

*3'Id. at 1363 n.7.
35 Id.

Id. at 1356 n.5.
'3'

.38

See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1019.
Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019 28 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200 12 (2000)).

1935 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
0 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2002) ("With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects
rights, the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to
practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the
world .... ).
[T]he Federal agency . . . shall have the right . . . to require the contractor, an
assignee or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to grant a nonexclusive,
partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a responsible
applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances,
and if the contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such request, to grant
such a license itself, if the Federal agency determines that such
(1) action is
necessary ... to achieve practical application of the subject invention; (2) . . . to
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Historically, the federal government owned all rights to research sponsored by
federal funds, and such research typically was not patented because it was
considered "public research."41 As such, "public research" was immediately and
freely available to the public, whereas "commercial research" funded by private
investment was kept secret until it was patented and able to generate revenue by
license. 42
However, progress in high-tech research, especially biomedical and
electronics-related research, increased investment in private industry, which in turn
43
increased interest in developing basic research.
In passing the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress recognized that the collaboration
between scientific research and business would allow rapid and efficient commercial
development of basic research. 44 Congress further recognized that allowing academic
institutions to pursue commercial development of their federally funded research
would be of greater value to the public than immediately distributing that research
45
to the public.
The experimental use exemption was originally thought to be unaffected by the
Bayh-Dole Act. Traditionally, industrial science refrained from pursuing litigation
against academic infringers due to the risk of bad publicity, high litigation costs, and
the risk of having patents deemed partially or wholly invalid. 46 A turning point came
when the experimental use defense failed in litigation between two industrial giants
47
in the landmark case Roche Products, Inc. v Bolar PharmaceuticalCo.
In Roche, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and held Bolar
liable for patent infringement. 48 Bolar used Roche's patented drug-testing
components to develop a generic version of a drug. 49 While Bolar planned to delay
manufacturing the generic drug until Roche's patent expired, Bolar needed to begin
the drug testing process in order to get approval from the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), a process that could take several years. 50 Bolar maintained
its testing was purely experimental, but the Federal Circuit found otherwise. 51
In handing down its decision in Roche, the Federal Circuit stated that Bolar's
use of the patented drug for testing violated the plain meaning of "use" in the patent

alleviate health or safety needs .... (3)to meet requirements fr public use
specified by Federal regulations .... or (4) ...because a licensee of the exclusive
right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of its
agreement obtained pursuant to section 204 [which requires substantial

manufacture of the invention in the United States].
35 U.S.C. § 203 (2002). See generally Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The BayhDole Act and the Hopkins v. CelPro March-In Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211
(2000).
41Valoir, supra note 40, at 212-13.
42 Id.
41See id.
44Valoir, supra note 40, at 213.
45 Id.

46 John Walsh et al., Working Through the PatentProblem, 299 SCIENCE 961, 1021 (Feb. 14,
2003).
4'733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
48
Id. at 860 61.
49Id. at
50 Id.

860.

51Id. at 858.
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infringement laws. 52 The Federal Circuit pointed out that an infringement suit may
be brought any time an unauthorized party uses a patented invention, with no legal
requirement for the patent holder to suffer damage or lost sales because of the
infringement. 53 Thus, even though Bolar's activities caused no financial loss to Roche
because the generic drug was not yet on the market, the Federal Circuit refused to
allow the drug testing under the experimental use exemption because Bolar intended
54
to profit in the future.
At first glance this decision may seem contrary to the well-developed theories of
the experimental use exemption, which require a showing that the infringing activity
resulted in economic gain by the infringer. 55 However, the Federal Circuit focused
instead on Bolar's ultimate profit motive, which was impetus in using the patented
drug for testing. The Federal Circuit stated that Bolar's drug testing activity fell
outside of the "truly narrow" experimental use exemption because it was conducted
in Bolar's ordinary course of business. 56 The court said it would not allow infringing
activities to be masked as experimental use when such activities have "definite,
57
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."
The Federal Circuit cited several Court of Claims cases in support of its
restrictive application of the experimental use exemption, and concluded that none of
the cases allowed infringing activities that contributed to the infringers' business
interests. 58
This decision further modified the experimental use exemption and
firmly established that the intent to make a profit is implied if the allegedly
infringing activity is associated with the infringer's legitimate business interests.
In response to the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche, Congress enacted the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 59 In addition to lengthening the patent term for drugs requiring
FDA approval before entering the market, the Hatch-Waxman Act also exempts
certain activities that would otherwise be infringing.60
The provisions of the Act
balance each other. The original patent holder is given an extension to the patent
term since several years of the patent's original term were lost during the FDA
approval process.
In trade, generic drug manufacturers are allowed to use the
original patented drug, although it is still protected by the patent, so the generic
drug can complete the FDA approval process and be ready for market release as soon
as the original patent expires.
The Act states that making, using or selling a
patented invention "solely for uses reasonably related" to gathering data in order to
acquire approval under the federal laws that regulates drug manufacture, use, or
sale, is not an act of patent infringement.6 1 Under this federal legislation, generic

52

Id. at 863.

5o3Id. at 861.

Id. at 863.
55 E.g., Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)(No. 17,600); Poppenhusen v. Falke,
19 Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.N.Y. 1861); Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935).
Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
Id. at 864.
aS Id. at 863.
. Mueller, supra note 6, at 25.
60 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2002).
14
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drug companies are permitted to freely use patented drugs and drug components in
62
order to test and gather data for FDA approval, before the patent expires.
Five years after Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the act to include testing for medical devices, which also
undergo a lengthy FDA approval process.6 3 The Court held that Congress intended
to provide symmetry in the legislation since both drug and medical device patent
terms were extended under §§ 201 and 202, allowing patent holders to recover some
of the exclusivity time spent while seeking FDA approval.6 4 Likewise, patent holders
of both drug and medical device patents must tolerate the infringing activities of
competing companies who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the
65
patent terms.
Several years later, in 2000, the Federal Circuit reiterated its interpretation of
the experimental use exemption following the Hatch-Waxman Act in its decision in
Embrex, Inc. v. Service EngineeringCorp. 66 The Plaintiff, Embrex, was the exclusive
licensee of a patent for vaccinating chicks before they hatched.6 7 Service Engineering
retained scientists to design a similar machine that would not infringe Embrex's
patent. 68
When Embrex filed suit for patent infringement, Service Engineering
defended itself by claiming its activities were merely involved in testing its own
machine. 69 The Federal Circuit found these tests were conducted "expressly for
commercial purposes," and refused to apply the "very narrow" experimental use
71
exemption. 70 The court held Service Engineering liable for patent infringement.
Furthermore, the court reiterated that the experimental use exemption would only
apply to activities done "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or strictly
philosophical inquiry" and would not apply to any use conducted under the "guise of
72
scientific inquiry."
The limits of the "guise of scientific inquiry" remained undetermined until the
court spoke again in Madey.73
Madey narrowed the experimental use exemption
almost into oblivion. It was the first infringement decision by the Federal Circuit
that held an academic research institution liable for infringement for using a
patented technology in the course of its own research. While the court did not
eliminate the experimental use exemption, the court did render the exception
74
worthless to academic institutions.
In discussing the District Court's holding, the Federal Circuit addressed the
growing involvement of academic institutions with commercial enterprises and
recognized that most academic institutions have extensive policies regarding

Donald S. Chisum,

CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 16.03 [1] (2003).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (1990).
61 Id. at 670 73.
(5Id.
6c 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
6- Id. at 1346.
68 Id. at 1346 47.
(.'Id. at 1349.
70 Id.
Id. at 1351.
I7
6)

b8-1

72 Id.

73 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
7' Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1019.
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patenting the work of their own researchers. 75 More importantly, the Federal Circuit
stated that the district court misinterpreted the experimental use exemption in Ruth,
an academic case relied on by most university legal departments. 76
Without
expressly overturning Ruth, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court failed to
analyze the "character, nature and effect" of the school's infringing activities and
instead determined that the experimental use exemption applied because the school
itself was non-profit. 77 The court said such broad application of the experimental use
exemption is inconsistent with its intended "very narrow" purpose. 78
The Federal Circuit's identification of Duke University as a legitimate business
has ignited controversy throughout the scientific community. 79
Prior to Madey,
universities that relied on the district court's interpretation of the experimental use
exemption in Ruth had not considered the use of patented technologies by academic
research to be an infringing activity.
However, following Madey, universities are
rethinking that position. 80 Some academics have cried foul, arguing that the court's
decision will hinder research by forcing scientists to spend precious research time
and money to obtain permission from patent holders, in addition to further time and
money spent along the way to keep track of which patented technologies are being
used in their research. 81
Still, academics recognize the line between basic and
commercial research at universities is blurred due to increasing industry-academic
research collaboration.8 2
These academics argue that the court is finally holding
universities
accountable for their commercial research activities and that
universities should no longer be allowed to blatantly infringe the patents of others
83
while seeking and enforcing their own.
Voices from industry have been noticeably silent, but in a recent survey of
academic and industrial scientists, most scientists from both camps admitted they
tolerate patent infringement by universities because litigation is too costly, the risk
of bad publicity is too great, or the risk of the court holding their patents narrowed or
invalidated is high.8 4 Some scientists even admitted they welcome a low level of
patent infringement because such "background infringement" can contribute to the
value of their invention by generating interest in the new technology. 85 This idea is
based on scientists' own admission that those who utilize a particular new technology
to solve a research problem are likely to continue to use that technology-and share
it with others-in the future. Thus, when the "background infringement" becomes
too great, the patent holders assert their property rights against the infringers by
offering a license to use the invention. The infringing scientists would then be forced
75 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1355.
76 Id. at 1362.

77 Id.
78 Id. at 1361 62.
79 See David Malakoff, Universities Ask Supreme Court to Reverse Patent Ruling, 299
SCIENCE 1, 26-27 (2003); David Resnik, Letter to the Editor: Patents and the Research Exemption,
229 SCIENCE 765, 821 22 (2003); Eliot Marshall, The UPSIDE of Good Behavior: Make Your Data
Freely Available, 229 SCIENCE 961, 990 (2003).
sC)Malakoff, supra note 79, at 26; Resnik, supra note 79, at 821.
81Malakoff, supra note 79, at 26.
82 Resnik, supra note 79, at 821.
881Id.

81Walsh, supra note 46, at 1021.
85 Id.
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to obtain a license for the technologies they have used in their research methods, or
search for new methods to solve the problems.
With impeccable timing, the National Academy of Sciences ("Academy"), which
has no legal authority but retains great influence over particular scientific journals,
issued a decree in early 2003 strongly urging scientists to release published materials
to other scientists as soon as possible, especially high-tech information such as
molecular biological material and computer software source codes.8 6 The Academy
previously appointed a review panel to study the issue of data release in light of the
"concerns about increasing commercial ties in academic life," but many scientists cite
the fervor surrounding sequencing the human genome two years ago.8 7
Celera
Genomics, one of the key companies in charge of the sequencing project, refused to
release the data to a public database and instead charged users for viewing the data
on its own Web site. Turmoil ensued because Celera charged different access fees to
88
academic and commercial users.
In the wake of this controversy, the Academy's decree states that any scientist
who wants to "verify or replicate" a published claim by another should have easy
access to all necessary materials-including materials protected by patent.8 9 At the
same time, the Academy's report indicates that licensing of such materials to those
who request them is acceptable. 90 However, the report urges patent holders to issue
equal license fees to everyone, regardless of whether the request comes from
academia or industry since "[there is no clear line between 'for-profit sector' and
'academic' research." 9 1 While it is too early to tell if the scientific community will
abide by its own policing, questions regarding enforceability of such a decree have
already surfaced. 92
Another twist in the plot has been infringement by state universities. In 1992,
Congress passed legislation that expressly abrogated sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment for states, instrumentalities of states, and state employees
acting in their official capacity in regard to patent infringement. 93 However, in 1999
the
Supreme
Court deemed the law unconstitutional in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.94
In striking
down the law, the Court said state sovereign immunity can only be abrogated under
the Fourteenth Amendment, not under Congress' Article I powers. 95 Since Congress
did not give a basis for abrogation of state immunity from patent infringement
86 NATL. ACAD. SCI., Sharing Publication-RelatedData and Materials: Responsibilities of
Authorship in the Life Sciences, available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309088593/html/ (March 4,
2003) [hereinafter NAT'L. ACAD. Sci.].
87Marshall, supra note 79.
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 NAT'L. ACAD. SCI., supra note 86 (noting that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
(MIT) patented process for small interfering RNAs (siRNAs) can be licensed directly from MIT or
indirectly through purchase of RNA oligonucleotides from a licensed vendor, since MIT incorporated
a license for the process of making siRNAs in its commercially available product).
91 Id.

92Marshall, supra note 79.

9 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, § 2(a)(2),
106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000)).
9d527 U.S. 627, 647 48 (1999).
95 Id. at 637.
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liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, the law was unconstitutional.9 6
However, the decision in College Savings Bank does not leave patent holders without
redress against state universities that infringe patents.
Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, state workers may be sued in federal court
in

their individual capacity. 97

Further, although patent holders

cannot

obtain

monetary compensation from the state, they may obtain injunctive relief.98 However,
injunctive relief against a state university under Eleventh Amendment state
immunity would still make litigation expensive and time-consuming. 99
The ramifications of College Savings Bank have not yet been explored in
litigation but the decision leaves open the potential for diverting scientific research
money
away
from
private
industry
and
towards
collaborating
academic
institutions. 100 As discussed, collaborations between private industry and academic
research labs have grown tremendously since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 101
However, allowing state universities sovereign immunity from patent infringement
may have the unforeseen consequence of indirectly granting immunity to private
industry collaborators who shift resources to the university for just such
protection. 102
It is not known what the threshold is for a minimum level of state
funding or control that enables the research endeavor to be an instrumentality of the
state, rather than a disguised extension of the private industry collaborator. 103

III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION REGARDING THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION
This article proposes development of federal legislation that increases access to
inventions that further science and technology while preserving the patent holder's
property rights. Private industry would likely oppose a statutory experimental use
exemption that would give competing universities free rein to use inventions
developed by private industry. 104 Furthermore, an overly broad experimental use
exemption would effectively strip the patent holders of their basic property rights,
which would reduce incentives for scientific innovation. 105 Congress must formulate
an experimental use exemption neither too narrow, nor too broad, but instead one
that represents a compromise between protecting patent holders' property rights and
allowing necessary access to scientific inventions that are used to further scientific
and technological development.

96 Id. at 639 43.

9- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908); see also Peter S. Menell, Symposium on New
Directionsin Federalism: Economic Implications of State Sovereign Imm unity from Infringement of
FederalIntellectualPropertyRights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399 (2000).
98 Menell, supra note 97, at 1404.
99 Id.
'oo Sharon K. Sandeen,
Preservingthe Public Trust in State-Owned Intellectual Property: A

Recommendation for Legislative Action, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 385 (Winter 2001); see also Mueller,
supra note 6, at 14.
101 Valoir, supra note 40, at 234.
112Mueller, supra note 6, at 33 34.
103 See id. at 36.
104

Resnik, supra note 79.

1o5Mueller, supra note 6, at 41.
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One possible solution is compulsory licensing. Proposed licensing agreements
range from narrow reach-through licensing of patented research toolsog to broad
research exemptions for patented work such as DNA sequences. 107 Reach-through
licensing implements a royalty fee schedule based on the ultimate market value of
the future product generated by using the research tool, rather than the present
market value of the tool itself. 108 Such licensing agreements are especially attractive
to small companies that can access the research tool with little or no upfront costs,
along with a promise to pay royalties from any future product that results from use of
the tool.109 Reach-through licensing has been opposed by the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH"), however, due to the restrictions it imposes on future products
undetermined at the time of the licensing agreement. 110 The NIH has stated that
such commercial attachments to future inventions complicate the problem of
ensuring easy access to the invention by all scientists. 1
Nonetheless, reach-through
licensing is presently employed frequently, especially in the areas of biotechnology
112
and pharmaceutical research.
Under NIH guidelines, research tools encompass any tool a scientist may use in
a laboratory in order to procure a "down-stream" invention.11 3 NIH has defined
research tools to include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models,
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry, DNA libraries, DNA clones and cloning
tools, methods, equipment and machines.11 4 The NIH guidelines were proposed in
response to concern that scientists were denied access to research tools when
inventors would refuse to transfer or license the technologies.' 1 5 While the NIH
supports seeking patents on inventions and licensing the inventions to scientists, the
institute strongly opposes "reach-through" licensing as a solution to the access
problem. 116
Instead, the NIH supports non-exclusive licensing in the form of
"execution or annual fees."11 7
The NIH also recommends establishing different
licenses for experimentation done with the research tool, rather than on the research
tool.118 Research done with the research tool would include developing or preparing a
final marketable product that may or may not incorporate the research tool used,
while research on the tool would involve only manipulating the tool itself in order to
improve it or further define its character.11 9
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Compulsory licensing has been opposed on the basis that it would encourage
inventors to keep their inventions hidden and not seek patent protection for fear of
being forced to license it.120
For the inventor with a break-through invention,
keeping the invention secret would allow the patent to retain more value than if it
were patented and forced into the hands of competitors through compulsory
licensing. However, keeping inventions secret runs contrary to the purpose of the
1 21
patent law, which is to promote science and reveal inventions to the public.
Furthermore, in the past, academic research was conducted as a race to publish
information. Today, however, the "race to publish" has been replaced with a "race to
patent" due to the involvement of academic institutions in patenting and
commercially developing their inventions.
Taken in the context of the National
Academy of Sciences' recent decree asking scientists to withhold from publication any
data that they do not intend to share with the larger scientific community, the
possibility of scientists maintaining their inventions in secret is greater than ever,
regardless of compulsory licensing.
However, those in favor of compulsory licensing point to foreign patent policies,
as well as to the doctrine of fair use under the United States Copyright law which
grants freedom to use copyrighted materials to anyone for research or education.122
Indeed, Japanese patent law provides for a limitation on the patent holder's rights
"for the purposes of experiment or research." 123 Likewise, France, Germany and
Great Britain all have patent laws that exempt certain activities, which would
otherwise be infringing for experimental or non-commercial purposes.1 24 Proponents
of implementing a compulsory licensing scheme in the United States argue that such
a scheme has not diminished scientific innovation whatsoever in Europe and Japan,
and may, in fact, contribute to innovation by increasing access to patented
1 25
inventions.
Another argument offered in favor of compulsory licensing is that it may be a
remedy in litigation for patent infringement.
The courts have used this remedy
sparsely however, usually only after a showing of egregious acts such as fraudulently
obtaining the patent, pursuing litigation as a mere sham, or violating antitrust
laws. 126
In the past, several bills introduced to Congress mandating compulsory licensing
for pharmaceutical drugs have faced stiff opposition from both patent holders as well
as patent practitioners. 127
Pharmaceutical drug companies maintained that
compulsory licensing would thwart drug development, since research and
development of drugs is time-consuming and expensive, and without the incentive of
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exclusive patent protection, investors will stop investing in drug companies. 128 These
bills, however, involved compulsory licensing of end-product pharmaceutical drug
inventions where the primary consumer is not a research scientist, but instead is a
member of the public acting through a physician or pharmacist. 129 The compulsory
license scheme this article proposes for using research tools would not apply to such
end-product inventions as pharmaceutical drugs. 130
Clearly, members of the scientific community, as well as the legal community,
recognize the need for legislative action in deciding the role that patented inventions
will play in the joint efforts of academic and industrial research.
While it is
important to maintain dissemination of technology to the public, it is equally
important to protect the property rights of patent holders.
This article proposes to retain the "truly narrow" experimental use exemption
while imposing a compulsory licensing scheme for research tools. In keeping with
Justice Story's original conclusion, and echoing a part of a proposal first put forth by
Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, 131 any non-commercial use of a patented invention to
verify the invention functions as described or fulfils its proposed utility should be
132
exempt from infringement liability.
Beyond this, Congress should mandate a compulsory licensing scheme that
would award a reasonable royalty to the patent holder for use of research tools. For
the purposes of compulsory licensing, Congress should adapt the NIH definition of
research tools with one further limitation: the research tool itself is not incorporated
into the end product. 133 Mandating compulsory licensing for the use of patented
research tools would allow scientists access to necessary inventions used to further
scientific development, while protecting the patent holder's economic interests in the
134
commercial development of marketable products that benefit the public.
The proposed exemption would only apply to the use element of patent
infringement, leaving the patent holder the option of authorizing a licensee to make
the invention. 135 Research tools inherently provide the basis for much of the conflict
regarding the experimental use exemption, since the value of the invention is
determined by its use. 136 End products, however, are inventions generated by using
research tools (such as diagnostic tests or pharmaceutical drugs) whose value is
predetermined by the character of the invention itself. 137
128Yosick,
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Calculating a "reasonable royalty" can be done in a number of ways, based on
existing contractual licensing agreements, as well as case law involving infringement
suits. One alternative is for manufacturers of research tools to include an inherent
license when others buy the product-this increases the cost of the product but
preserves the patent holder's rights. 138
Another alternative is to calculate the
licensing fee as a percentage of the infringer's "net margin" of its operating income. 139
Yet another option is to base the licensing royalty on the difference between the
infringer's "normal net profit" and the "anticipated net profit" the infringer will
ultimately realize as a result of infringing activities. 140
Clearly, establishing a
"reasonable royalty" may not be a simple task but one that is necessary to ensure fair
dealing both among and between scientists in academic and industrial settings. One
inherent safeguard against inflated royalty fees under the proposed compulsory
licensing program is that academic and industrial scientists would be cross-licensing
their technologies to each other.
As discussed, academic research cannot easily be distinguished from industrial
research.141
The Bayh-Dole Act allowed for heavy commercialization of federally
funded inventions, which caused a massive entanglement of industry and academic
research.142
Industrial science is now able to build on basic research started in
academic institutions, and academic institutions are now pursuing commercial
applications of their inventions, as well as starting related biotech companies of their
own. 143
Thus, in accordance with the National Academy of Sciences' decree,
compulsory licensing of research tools should apply regardless of whether the patent
holder is in private industry or an academic setting.
Applying the proposed compulsory licensing scheme evenhandedly to patent
holders from academic and private industry alike will lessen the impact of potential
shifting of resources from industry to state institutions following the decision in
College Savings Bank.
While state institutions will maintain their Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity from patent infringement liability, such institutions
would still be required to license patented research tools under the proposed
compulsory licensing scheme.
Such an application of the proposed compulsory
licensing scheme recognizes that state universities have business objectives in mind
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when they pursue patents on research tools, and therefore state universities should
receive no beneficial treatment for licensing their technologies. 144
Alternatively, a two-tier licensing program could be implemented. In a two-tier
program, the first tier is the reasonable royalty calculated as described, while the
second tier is a reduced royalty option available to those who would similarly qualify
for Small Entity Status under the United States Patent and Trademark Office
guidelines. 145 Under these guidelines, individual inventors, small businesses or nonprofit institutions (including universities) qualifying for Small Entity Status pay
reduced fees for procuring a patent. 146
This assures the costs of patenting an
invention do not prohibit small entities from attaining patent protection. Extending
this assurance to the proposed compulsory licensing scheme would further protect
the interests of academic and other non-profit inventors, whose primary source of
income is the federal government.
Under the proposed compulsory licensing scheme, the overall result in Madey
may or may not be similar to the Federal Circuit's decision. If the court found
Madey's laser to be a research tool (arguably "equipment" in the NIH list), then Duke
University would be forced to license the laser from Madey, and Madey could not
refuse to grant a license. However, if the court found the laser was not included in
the list of research tools, Madey could deny Duke University access to the laser
altogether.
The Federal Circuit remanded the Madey case to the district court on several
grounds and the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari. 147 One of the remedies
presently available to the court is compulsory licensing to compensate Madey for the
infringing activities of Duke University. Regardless of the outcome in the district
court, it is clear the Federal Circuit indicated academic institutions receive no
particular protection from patent infringement liability under the experimental use
exemption.

IV. CONCLUSION
While the Federal Circuit has maintained a "truly narrow" experimental use
exemption, this narrow exemption is no longer practical.
Both academic and
industrial scientists admit access to patented inventions does not usually come
easy. 148
Furthermore, the Bayh-Dole Act allowed academic institutions to pursue
patent protection for federally funded research. 149 This has dramatically increased
the overall number of patents pursued, as well as complicated the academic claim to
150
an experimental use exemption.
The compulsory licensing scheme proposed in this article allows Congress to
ensure patent holders receive compensation for the use of their property rights, while
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fellow scientists are provided access to research tools needed to further develop
science and technology.

